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ABSTRACT 
Alcohol and drug misuse in pregnancy can cause long-term harm to the born-alive child. 
Where pregnant women decide to bring the foetus to term but resist medical treatment 
that will benefit them both, there are two ways in which the law might force it upon 
them. English courts have resisted the first option which is to grant the foetus a limited 
right to life under Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The second option is to 
utilise existing criminal, medical and mental health laws to compel pregnant women into 
treatment for their own good. Some states in the USA utilise such measures. This article 
considers the potential to do so in English law and the consequences for drug and alcohol 
dependent pregnant women and their children. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is now well documented that alcohol and drug misuse in 
pregnancy can cause serious and lasting harm to the born-alive child. 
The law might seek to compensate children or punish mothers1 but can 
and should it be used to compel pregnant women into treatment? 
Even minimal intake can damage the foetus,2 but in the UK 
health promotion rather than legal constraint is currently deemed 
sufficient to protect it. The link between the activity and harm is 
tenuous and dependent upon multiple factors. It would be unfair 
to prevent a pregnant woman from drinking a glass of wine when 
a genetic predisposition, painting the nursery, refuelling the car or 
passively breathing in her husband's tobacco smoke are potentially as 
harmful. Further, it would require draconian laws to prioritise foetal 
health. Maternal choice would inevitably suffer. Given the lack of 
legal personhood status on the part of the foetus, 3 this cannot be 
countenanced. 
 
Where alcohol or drug misuse in pregnancy reaches the level 
of dependency, however, a much stronger causal link emerges to 
harm to any resulting children. Since the National Treatment Agency 
was established within the NHS in 2001, significant improvements 
have been made to the availability and effectiveness of voluntary 
treatment for drug misuse in England.4 The objective is a maximum 
three-week wait for treatment and particular efforts are made to 
ensure that vulnerable users, such as pregnant women and offenders, 
are prioritised.5 Nevertheless, whilst I do not suggest that pregnant 
addicts who intend to carry their foetuses to term will deliberately 
shun treatment, the involvement of the criminal justice system, 
social stigma, and fear of child-protection policies, not to mention 
the strong hold drugs and alcohol have over those addicted to them, 
will inevitably lead to cases where women refuse treatment to the 
detriment of their future children. 
 
Might an exception to the general rule be made in such cases? 
There are two grounds on which it might. In some parts of the USA, 
the viable foetus has personhood status. 6 The first option is to follow 
this example and accord the foetus a limited right to life under Article 
2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, thereby creating a positive duty to 
protect it from harm. My concern rests with pregnant women who 
intend to carry their foetuses to term. Short of natural miscarriage, it 
is the protection of future children that is at issue. Margaret Brazier 
asserts that a stronger moral duty is owed by women who intend to 
carry their pregnancies to term than those who choose to terminate 
their pregnancies,7 but warns against translating the moral duty into 
law: 
[O]nce legal means are used to compel a woman to accept the case 
made for the foetus at whatever cost to her, we have abandoned the 
language of choice for the crudity of compulsion. We have ceased 
to recognize the pregnant woman's capacity to make her own moral 
choices for herself and her child. 8 
 
To date the English courts have refused to extend rights to the 
foetus and, though it would not necessarily contravene the European 
Convention on Human Rights or the Human Rights Act 1998 to give 
the viable foetus a limited right to life, it is unlikely that Brazier's 
wise words of warning will be ignored in the near future. 
But the conferral of rights on the foetus is not the only means 
of protecting it. In Vo v France, 9 the European Court of Human 
Rights recognised that it will sometimes be appropriate for the law to 
safeguard the interests of the foetus without invoking rights language. 10 
The second option involves the utilisation of existing laws to target 
pregnant women for treatment or incarceration. There is precedent for 
this option too in the United States." However, though this approach 
avoids some of the pitfalls inherent in the conferral of rights on the 
foetus, I argue that it would be discriminatory and of dubious benefit. 
Pregnant addicts would shun health care to avoid detection. It would 
constitute a step backwards. 
 
2. ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN PREGNANCY- THE EFFECTS 
Children born to drug and alcohol dependent women can 
suffer a range of effects. Imbibing heroin and opiates can lead to 
neonatal abstinence syndrome, 12 which in tum can affect maternal 
attachment. 13 However, with the pregnant woman's cooperation, this 
can be managed with few long-term consequences for the born-alive 
child. The effects of maternal cocaine use in pregnancy however, 
can be much more enduring. 14 It is associated with premature birth, 
withdrawal problems, birth defects and problems with the central 
nervous system which are not always apparent at birth, but emerge as 
the child grows. Recently, the rise of pharmaceutical and prescription 
drug misuse whereby illegal copies of licensed drugs are traded over 
the Internet is giving increased cause for concern.15 
 
Alcohol is a known teratogen. 16 Its effects in pregnancy are 
rendered more devastating by the prevalence of alcohol addiction 
and the potential harmful effects of even moderate intake. It has 
been described as the commonest preventable (non-genetic) cause of 
mental retardation in neonates in the Western world.17 Moderate or 
excessive intake can result in a normal child, a child suffering Foetal 
Alcohol Effects or, in the worst cases, Foetal Alcohol Syndrome 
(FAS).18 Though this problem is well documented in the USA, the 
Department of Health has only recently begun to collect data on the 
incidence of FAS. It is likely that both the prevalence and impact 
of FAS in the UK is considerably underestimated. 19 Awareness is 
growing. Foetal Alcohol Syndrome Aware UK,20 and the UK National 
Organisation on Foetal Alcohol Syndrome21 are actively campaigning 
for greater recognition of the effects of alcohol in pregnancy and 
better diagnosis and support of children and adults within the Foetal 
Alcohol Disorder Spectrum. 
 
In 2003 the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs estimated 
that there were between 250,000 and 350,000 children of problem drug 
users in the UK. 22 The Inquiry highlighted the extent of harm caused 
by drug misuse that was previously hidden or ignored, emphasising 
the need for action in policy and practice. Other research indicates 
that treatment compliance in pregnancy can be directly correlated 
with superior outcomes for the resulting child. 23 As a result the 
English National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse prioritises 
the treatment of pregnant women and other particularly vulnerable 
groups. 24 It aims to reduce waiting times and ensure better access to 
treatment including, where appropriate, residential services. 25 
Ensuring that treatment places are available to those who need 
them is vital. Pregnancy offers a powerful incentive to seek treatment. 
However treatment is rarely straightforward due to poly-drug use, the 
risk of transmission of blood-borne viruses to the foetus, links with 
mental health problems, poverty, and fear of stigmatisation and child 
protection policies. Consequently, some pregnant addicts shun medical 
intervention or present late in pregnancy when treatment options are 
limited. The impact on the future child of moves to reduce waiting 
times and improve services in order to support consensual treatment 
is inevitably limited by these factors. In this paper I explore two 
options by which the viable foetus could be protected from its 
mother's potentially harmful addiction. 
 
3. A RIGHT TO LIFE FOR THE VIABLE FOETUS? 
In England and Wales, the criminal law has gradually limited its 
protection of the foetus. Section 58 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 prohibits pregnant women or third parties from committing 
any unlawful abortion whatsoever, punishable on conviction by life 
imprisonment, 26 but the definition of 'unlawful' has changed over 
time. The Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 marked a step away from 
protection of the foetus as an entity of equal value and gave preference 
to the health of the pregnant woman when abortion was necessary to 
save her life. 27 At the same time it emphasised the importance of the 
viable foetus as it neared fulfilment of its potential for human life. 28 
The Abortion Act 1967, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, liberalised abortion law further still. 29 Today 
the debate surrounding the appropriate level of foetal protection takes 
place in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000, rendering the 
Convention articles enforceable against public authorities, but to date 
its impact on abortion law has been minimal.30 
 
Article 4 of the American Convention of Human Rights 
provides that the right to life must be protected 'in general, from 
the moment of conception'. Conversely, whilst Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights protects everyone's right 
to life, the term 'everyone' is undefined. Article 2 is a fundamental 
requirement of the Convention, from which no derogation is possible. 
The right to life imposes upon the state not only negative obligations 
not to take life, but also positive obligations to protect it. Drug and 
alcohol dependency in pregnancy clearly endangers foetal life and 
would arguably, if the foetus were recognised as a 'life', require the 
government to impose preventative measures. 
 
Whilst the pregnant woman has a 'right to respect for [her] 
private and family life' under Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the right is limited by Article 8(2) in order to 
protect, amongst other things, 'the rights and freedoms of others' 31 , 
and 'health and morals'. If the foetus is viewed as an 'other' for the 
purposes of the Convention, then it would arguably be legitimate to 
compel pregnant addicts into treatment for its protection. 
 
In the English case, Paton v Trustees of the British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service32 a husband, on behalf of the foetus, sought an 
injunction to prevent his wife from terminating her pregnancy. His 
case failed: the foetus has no legal standing in English law, nor can it 
by its next friend restrain its mother from terminating the pregnancy,33 
nor can it be made a ward of court. 34 
 
Paton took his case to the European Commission of Human 
Rights35 where it was established that the right to life contained in 
Article 2 does not necessarily extend to the foetus. Indeed, it was 
recognised that an absolute right to life of the foetus would be 
incompatible with the purpose of the Convention because greater value 
would be placed on the foetus's life than the pregnant woman's. The 
position taken in English law did not therefore necessarily contravene 
the European Convention. 
 
The possibility of a limited right to life, however, was left 
in Paton to each Member State and to the circumstances of the 
particular case. Due to the foetus's human origins, its potential to 
become a person and the lack of European consensus on the legal (or 
scientific) definition of personhood the issue falls within the margin 
of appreciation. The European Commission of Human Rights was 
careful not to consider whether a foetal right to life at a later stage, 
but before birth might be Convention-compliant.36 
 
The issue came to the fore again in Vo v France,37 when the 
European Court of Human Rights considered the relevance of Article 
2 in a case involving a third party harming the foetus. Once again, 
the Court declined to take a stance on when the right to life begins. It 
was affirmed that the issue comes within the margin of appreciation 
of each member state. 38 The Court did not, however, rule that Article 
2 cannot in any circumstances apply to the foetus. 39 Instead the Court 
stated that 'the unborn child is not regarded as a 'person' directly 
protected by Article 2 of the Convention and that if the unborn do 
have a 'right' to 'life', it is implicitly limited by the mother's rights 
and interests' .40 Neither did the Court's refusal to recognise a foetal 
right to life rest on the basis that the foetus is devoid of value. Indeed 
the court recognised that safeguards may be extended to the foetus 
under certain circumstances, in the name of human dignity, without 
making it a person with human rights.41 
 
In England, Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 was applied 
in Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd.42 Arden LJ drew a distinction 
between an embryo and a viable foetus. The embryo, in her view, 
does not have even a limited right to life.43 This is not to say that 
the viable foetus does have any such right. Indeed to confer such a 
right upon it, no matter the limitations, would almost certainly affect 
the rights of pregnant women in other contexts. Thus, whilst it is 
established that in English law the foetus does not have an absolute 
right to life, 44 it is at least conceivable that a limited right to life 
would be compatible with the Convention.45 The right might, for 
example, be applied to the foetus only when it has become viable or 
reached another gestational juncture. 
 
A limited right to life would, however, be fraught with problems. 
Definitions such as 'viability' are scientifically imprecise and the 
right would be difficult to limit. Fears of a slippery slope are well grounded. 
It would also have harmful practical ramifications for both 
pregnant woman and foetus. Preventing harm to the foetus only from 
viability is of limited value. Addiction probably causes more damage 
to the developing foetus in the first trimester. For the pregnant woman, 
detection is likely to involve compulsory testing, frightening her from 
prenatal care, forcing upon doctors an unenviable policing role and 
compromising confidentiality. 
 
For these reasons, in England at least, the theoretical possibility 
of a limited right to life is unlikely to be translated into a legal right. 
The language of rights is an all-or-nothing one. However, we have 
seen that the European Court of Human Rights in Vo v France, whilst 
reluctant to accord the right to life to the foetus, did recognise it as 
an organism of worth that deserves protection in the name of human 
dignity.46 In English law too, the non-conferral of rights on the foetus 
does not mean that the foetus is of no recognised value Y As R. Scott 
eloquently illustrates, English law values the foetus without invoking 
rights language in a number of ways. In particular, the born-alive 
child can, in certain situations, act on injuries earlier received.48 But 
in what ways might the foetus be protected before it is born? 
In England, judges have struggled to achieve an appropriate 
balance. Whilst the foetus does not have a right to life, the pregnant 
woman does have a right to private and family life under Article 
8 of the ECHR. This does not rest easily with traditional concepts 
of autonomy. Autonomy, the ability to self-rule, is traditionally 
centred on the individual but, in Karpin's words, the pregnant woman 
is 'not-one-but-not-two'.49 The pregnant woman and foetus are 
inter-connected rather than separate. Behind the English courts alior- 
nothing language, the assertion of the rights of pregnant women 
and the lack of foetal rights, judges strive to extend safeguards to 
the foetus whether out of respect for its human dignity, potential to 
become human, its human origins or its inter-connectedness with the 
pregnant woman. Lord Mustill in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 
3 of 1994 )5° recognised the foetus as 'a unique organism'. And Lord 
Justice Judge in St George's Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v S stated that 
'the interests of the foetus cannot be disregarded on the basis that in 
refusing treatment which would benefit the foetus, a mother is simply 
refusing treatment for herself' ;51 moreover, that ' [ w ]hatever else it 
may be, a 36-week foetus is not nothing; if viable it is not lifeless 
and it is certainly human'.52 
 
Faced with increasing evidence of the ill-effects to the future 
child caused by addiction in pregnancy, English judges cannot 
protect the foetus by according it an absolute right to life. Though, 
in theory, a limited right to life might be Convention-compliant, it 
would be fraught with difficulties relating to the practical effects on 
the pregnant woman and foetus and the detrimental effect it would 
have on the rights of the pregnant woman. Might judges instead 
utilise existing laws to 'help' pregnant women who intend to carry 
their pregnancies to term but cannot or will not accept treatment, 
by compelling them to do so? In the next section I explore means 
by which the foetuses of drug- or alcohol-addicted women might be 
protected without violating the women's human rights and warn of 
the dangers inherent in such a strategy. 
 
4. UTILISING EXISTING MEASURES TO VICARIOUSLY 
PROTECT THE FOETUS 
 
The examination of English cases on the foetal right to life 
reveals a judicial reluctance to accord personhood status on the 
foetus. But it also discloses a desire to protect the foetus in certain, 
unnamed circumstances, on another basis. We have seen that the 
pregnant woman has a right to respect for her private life under 
Article 8 of the European Convention. The right is limited by Article 
8(2) for 'the prevention of disorder or crime,' and 'the protection 
of health and morals'. As we shall see, involuntary treatment of an 
addicted pregnant woman might be defensible under either of these 
limitations. In this section I will explore three ways in which this 
might be achieved in the context of drug and alcohol dependency in 
pregnancy. 
 
4.1 Medical Law 
 
A drug or alcohol addict can rarely desist without extensive 
support. In the worst cases, support must extend to residential 
treatment. In pregnancy treatment is especially complex as withdrawal 
can compromise the health of the foetus. In English law a competent 
person cannot be treated without consent. In Re T (Adult: refusal of 
medical treatment) Lord Donaldson stated that a person may withhold 
consent to medical treatment, even if he will die as a result. 53 The 
morality or rationality of the patient's decision is irrelevant. He went 
on to state a possible exception to this rule where 'the choice may 
lead to the death of a viable foetus' 54 ; a statement relied upon by Sir 
Stephen Brown P in Re S,55 when he authorised a caesarean section 
operation to save a viable foetus. It has since been established that 
no such exception exists.56 Where a competent pregnant woman 
withholds consent to treatment that is beneficial or even life-saving 
to her and I or the foetus, it is a battery to proceed. Any moral duty 
she may owe to the foetus is not transcribed into law. 
In the United States there have been cases where pregnant addicts 
have been hospitalised to protect the foetus.57 Indeed Wisconsin's 
Children's Code58 provides that: 
 
An order of the judge if made upon a showing satisfactory to the judge 
that due to the adult expectant mother's habitual lack of self-control 
in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled 
substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree, there is a substantial 
risk that the physical health of the unborn child, and of the child 
when born, will be seriously affected or endangered unless the adult 
expectant mother is taken into custody and that the adult expectant 
mother is refusing or has refused to accept any alcohol or other drug 
abuse services offered to her or is not making or has not made a good 
faith effort to participate in any alcohol or other drug abuse services 
offered to her. The order shall specify that the adult expectant mother 
be held in custody under s.48.207. 
 
The law in England, however, is clear: the choices and conduct 
of the pregnant woman which may harm or even kill the foetus and 
born-alive child, cannot be restrained by law. In ReF (in uteroj59 the 
Court of Appeal held that a local authority cannot make a foetus a 
ward of court. 60 Having recognised that the case could not proceed 
on the authorities, Balcombe LJ quoted Lowe on the dangers of 
allowing such a claim: 
 
It would mean for example, that the mother would be unable to leave 
the jurisdiction without the court's consent. The court being charged 
to protect the foetus' welfare would surely have to order the mother to 
stop smoking, imbibing alcohol and indeed any activity which might 
be hazardous to the child. Taking it to the extreme were the court to 
be faced with saving the baby's life or the mother's it would surely 
have to protect the baby's.61 
 
The law will protect the pregnant woman's choices, even if 
harm or death to the foetus results. However, this is not necessarily 
the case if the pregnant woman lacks the mental capacity to make 
the particular decision. 
 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 comes into force in April 2007. 
To a large extent it codifies the current common law position but for 
brevity's sake I will restrict my analysis to the new legislation. How 
might the Act apply to pregnant women refusing treatment for drug 
or alcohol addiction? There is potential for the Act to be utilised to 
force some addicts into treatment that would benefit their foetuses, 
but the circumstances for doing so are restricted. 
 
Five principles underpin the Act.62 Section 1(2) contains a 
presumption of capacity. The pregnant addict will be presumed 
to have capacity unless it can be demonstrated that she does not. 
Section 1 ( 4) provides that 'a person is not to be treated as unable 
to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision'. 
Clearly the fact that the pregnant woman and the foetus will suffer 
harm as a result of her refusal to consent will not be indicative of a 
lack of capacity. A person lacks capacity if ' ... at the material time 
he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter 
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, 
the mind or brain.'63 The test has two stages: The 'impairment or 
disturbance' stage involves a 'diagnostic threshold' for capacity.64 The 
existence of the condition of addiction does not necessarily imply that 
the individual lacks capacity.65 The second stage involves the person's 
inability at the particular time to make a particular decision. 
 
So a pregnant woman will not be viewed as lacking capacity 
merely by virtue of her addiction. Yet, the terms of the Act are 
sufficiently wide so that at least some addicts will be viewed as 
lacking capacity to make a given treatment decision. 
The test for capacity is decision-specific. The temporary nature 
of dependency is irrelevant66 provided the impairment exists at the 
material time. A person is unable to make a decision for himself 
if he satisfies one of the four conditions listed in section 3(1), one 
being that he is unable 'to use or weigh that information as part 
of the process of making a decision'. Butler-Sloss LJ recognised in 
Re MB67 that the pregnant woman might suffer temporary incapacity 
caused by shock, pain or drugs. Whilst Butler-Sloss LJ was making 
reference to drugs administered by medical professionals during 
labour, it is conceivable that illicit drug dependency may on occasion 
have a similar effect on capacity under the terms of the new Act. 
The NHS Direct Online Health Encyclopaedia defines addiction 
in the following terms: 'Addiction is not having control over doing, 
taking or using something, to the point that it may be harmful to 
you. . . . Whatever the addiction may be, the person cannot control 
how they use it, or become dependant on it to get through daily 
life.' 68 
 
The National Pain Foundation defines drug dependency as: 'The 
situation where a patient may come to feel the absolute need for 
a drug (psychological dependency) or will experience withdrawal 
symptoms if the drug is taken away (physical dependency)' .69 
Though there is not, to my knowledge an English case defining 
the term 'addiction', the European Court of Human Rights in 
Witold Litwa v. Polantf'0 defined the term alcoholic as a 'psychiatric 
condition'71 and later as a 'clinical condition'.72 
 
It is arguable that true dependency renders some individuals 
incapable of properly 'weigh[ing] that information'. If so, the decision 
to refuse treatment might be more than 'unwise'. It might constitute 
a symptom of addiction which treatment would aim to eradicate. 
Indeed the Draft Code of Practice on the Mental Capacity Act, put 
out for consultation between January and June 2006 states that: 'The 
impairment or disturbance may occur in a wide range of situations. 
Examples include people who are affected by the symptoms of alcohol 
or drug misuse, delirium, or following head injury, as well as the 
more obvious categories of mental illness ... .'73 It is likely that this 
example will be retained in the final Code expected early in 2007.74 
Under section 1(5), once it is shown that an individual lacks the 
capacity to make a specific decision, any treatment imposed must be 
in her 'best interests'. The term is defined in section 4. An individual's 
'condition' must not lead to the making of 'unjustified assumptions' 
about her best interests75 and the past and present wishes and values 
and beliefs of the person lacking capacity must be factored into the 
decision. 76 For the addict, the fact that treatment is in her medical 
best interests is not by any means determinative. 
 
What of the best interests of the foetus? As we have seen, the 
foetus is not a separate entity in English law. Its best interests are 
irrelevant under the Act except insofar as they impinge on the interests 
of the pregnant woman. 
 
Yet, the best interests of the pregnant woman might incorporate 
those of the foetus where it is felt that the beliefs and values and 
the past feelings and wishes of the pregnant woman would support 
such a decision. 77 In making this determination the views of relevant 
others, including carers and family should be taken into account.78 
The Mental Capacity Act imposes additional conditions where 
restraint is required. Under section 6, the practitioner must reasonably 
believe that it is necessary to restrain the patient in order to prevent 
harm to her and the act must be a proportionate response to the 
likelihood of her suffering harm and to the seriousness of the harm. 
Where the practitioner can demonstrate the likelihood of harm to the 
born alive child resulting in substantial harm to the future mother it 
is possible that section 6 would be satisfied. 
 
Section 6(5) goes on to stipulate that the restraint should not 
offend Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which protects the right to liberty subject to six limitations, the most 
pertinent being Article 5(1)(e): 'the lawful detention of persons for 
the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons 
of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants.' 79 In 
Witold Litwa v Poland"0 the European Court of Human Rights gave 
alcoholism a wide meaning which incorporated intoxication. The 
purpose of Article 5(1)(e), the court held, is to protect anyone whose 
conduct under the influence of alcohol threatens public order or their 
own health or personal interests. 81 
 
Under section 1(6) ' ... regard must be had to whether the 
purpose for which [the act] is needed can be as effectively achieved 
in a way that is less restrictive of the person's rights and freedom 
of action' and under s.4(3)(a) the person making the determination 
must consider 'whether it is likely that the person will at some time 
have capacity in relation to the matter in question'. Treatment during 
pregnancy will benefit the foetus. But by waiting until a later date, 
the woman may be persuaded to undergo consensual treatment. 
Arguably her best interests would be served by delaying treatment. 
However this will not prove the case where it can be demonstrated 
that the pregnant woman would want to undergo treatment to protect 
her own health and that of the foetus, but for the influence of the 
drugs. Recall that the temporary nature of capacity is irrelevant if 
the person lacks capacity at the 'material time'. 82 Delaying treatment 
in the hope that the pregnant woman regains capacity may result in 
additional damage to the foetus. This, in tum, may prove harmful to 
the pregnant woman. 
 
Might one go further and suggest that a medical practitioner who 
is aware that his pregnant patient is dependent on drugs and alcohol 
but unconditionally accepts her refusal of treatment or her decision to 
withdraw from treatment might be liable for his omission? The Act is 
framed to protect people from being labelled as lacking capacity when 
in fact they have the competence to make the relevant decision. It is 
not designed to protect those who would benefit from being labelled 
as lacking capacity from failures to do so. Thus section 5 states that 
a person making a care or treatment decision without the consent of 
the person ('P') will not be liable under the Act provided he properly 
assessed capacity and acted in 'P's best interests. The converse is 
not true: a doctor failing to label someone as lacking capacity faces 
no liability under the Act. However, nothing in Section 5 excludes a 
person's civil liability: an action in negligence on these grounds is 
not inconceivable though the causational difficulties inherent in such 
a claim would be onerous. 
 
Given the complexities involved in assessing the capacity and 
best interests of a pregnant addict, it is likely that someone making 
a treatment decision will seek permission to apply to the new Court 
of Protection, established by section 45 of the Act. Alternatively, if 
the pregnant woman wishes to object to treatment under compulsion 
under the Act, she has a right to apply to the court under section 
50(1)(a); permission is not required. The court can make declarations 
regarding the person's capacity and the lawfulness of an act done, or 
yet to be done. Alternatively it can make decisions on the person's 
behalf or appoint deputies to do so. 
 
We must await a decision of the new Court of Protection for 
further guidance on this issue, but it seems reasonable to suggest that 
a court seeking to protect the foetus from harm caused by its drug or 
alcohol-dependent mother without giving it human rights, would 
have a means of doing so via the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Indeed, 
it may be that a lower threshold will suffice: that drug or alcohol 
misuse rather than dependency or addiction will enable a lack of 
capacity to be established in relation to a relevant treatment decision. 
The Draft Code of Practice on the Mental Capacity Act refers to 
'misuse', and we have seen that the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that Article 5(1)(e) incorporates both addiction and 
intoxication. Proving lack of capacity is not insurmountable. Proving 
best interests is more problematic and is dependent on the aligning 
of the interests of mother and foetus. 
 
4.2 Mental Health Law 
If the pregnant woman can be shown to be suffering from a 
mental disorder under the Mental Health Act 1983, then her capacity 
to decide is irrelevant. Compulsory emergency treatment for the 
mental disorder can be ordered under section 63. The relationship 
between drug misuse and mental disorder is complex but frequently 
interlinked. Dual diagnosis is becoming increasingly common. In 
Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH84 a 41-year-old 
pregnant woman suffering from paranoid schizophrenia was detained 
under the Mental Health Act 1983, section 3. The court granted a 
declaration that a caesarean section operation could be performed 
without her consent on the ground that it was treatment ancillary 
to her mental health. Her mental health would suffer if the baby 
was still-born and the operation would prevent her mental health 
deteriorating. The decision was much criticised and seems to extend 
the scope of the Act far beyond the intention of the framers, 85 but it 
has not been overruled. Conceivably, the fact that a patient is pregnant 
and will harm her future child through drug or alcohol abuse might, 
in the face of evidence that it will lead to a worsening of her mental 
disorder, be enough to convince a judge that she should be compelled 
to undergo treatment. 
 
This is all very well when the pregnant woman suffers an 
ancillary mental disorder, but can drug or alcohol dependency alone 
lead to treatment under compulsion under the Mental Health Act 1983? 
At present an exclusion clause prevents the labelling of a person as 
suffering from a 'mental disorder' purely 'by reason of promiscuity 
or other immoral conduct, sexual deviancy or dependence on alcohol 
or drugs' .86 The government, in their ill-fated draft Mental Health 
Bill 2002 sought to remove this exclusion clause in order to allow 
detention and treatment on grounds of dependency alone. 
As we have seen, the deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights provides an exception 
for alcoholics or drug addicts, so the draft was arguably Convention complaint. 
Several states in America have successfully implemented 
involuntary treatment programmes87 supported by the National Institute 
for Health which states that treatment does not need to be voluntary to 
be effective and that motivations, sanctions and enticements increase 
both treatment entry and success. 88 
 
In England uproar from the mental health profession89 prevented 
the proliferation of a similar policy here. The government at last 
agreed to reinsert the exclusion clause in 2005,90 and then abandoned 
the Bill altogether in March 2006. The aim is now to modify the 
1983 Act. The government's message that dependency can and 
should on occasion be equated to mental disorder is at odds with its 
work to secure additional treatment places for those who want them. 
Trust is essential if dependent persons are going to come forward for 
voluntary treatment. 
 
4.3 Criminal law 
Drug and alcohol use are high on the political agenda, but there 
is debate as to whether dependency is a criminal or a clinical problem. 
In England it is frequently treated as an amalgamation of the two, 
with potentially damaging consequences.91 Where a pregnant addict 
commits a criminal offence, the criminal law might be utilised to 
protect the foetus. Incarceration should in theory limit access to illicit 
drugs92 or alternatively, a treatment order may be made in certain 
circumstances. 
Drug users frequently come into contact with the criminal 
justice system when the aim of their criminal offence is to fund drug 
purchase, when an offence is committed whilst under the influence 
of an illicit drug, or when they are found to be in possession of an 
illegal drug. The latter scenario is the most controversial. Liberalists 
argue that personal use should be decriminalised and recognised as a 
clinical rather than a criminal justice problem.93 It is the traffickers 
and suppliers, they claim, who should be the subject of criminal 
investigation. The voluntary organisation Turning Point, for example, 
counsels against the imprisonment of drug users, except where they 
pose a risk to public protection.94 
 
Historically users coming into contact with the criminal justice 
system were frequently propelled back into dependency after 
completion of their sentence.95 Recent legislation is designed to 
counteract this trend.96 From 1 October 2000, inspired by the success 
of designated 'drugs courts' in the USA, English courts were able to 
issue Drug Testing and Treatment Orders (DTTOs )97 where offenders 
tested positive for a Class A drug on arrest. DTTOs required the 
consenting offender to undergo an intensive programme of treatment 
and testing. In April 2005 they were replaced by the new generic 
community sentence98 to enable bespoke sentencing to suit the 
offender's needs and crime. With the offender's consent, mental 
health treatment, drug treatment and testing or alcohol treatment99 
amongst other tailor-made requirements, can make up part of his 
community sentence. Failure to adhere to the treatment plan results 
in a return to court for breach of the order. In April 2005, the Drugs 
Act 2005 entered into force giving law enforcement agencies powers 
to test persons for cocaine and heroin on arrest and, the test proving 
positive, to require a drug counselling session. 
 
Difficulties surround the merging of health and criminal justice 
initiatives. 100 Where one views the drug user as an offender, the other 
treats him as a patient. Confidentiality is severely compromised and 
the therapeutic aims of treatment do not rest easily with the mandatory 
testing elements of the Order, though there is evidence that treatment 
provided by the criminal justice system is as effective as voluntary 
treatment.101 Consent of the offender is only partial in that an initial 
or subsequent refusal of consent or withdrawal of cooperation will 
lead to resentencing. Nevertheless, this remains one potential means 
of getting users (including pregnant users) into treatment. 
 
The law might go further in the case of drug- or alcohol-dependent 
pregnant women and criminalise intentional behaviour that creates a 
substantial risk of serious injury without justification. Illicit drug use 
or alcohol consumption over a prescribed limit might be outlawed in this way. 
Just as it is illegal to drive with a certain level of alcohol 
in the blood, so too excessive alcohol consumption in pregnancy 
could be proscribed. But, even if human rights objections could be 
overcome, how would such a law be policed? More importantly, what 
effect would the policing of the law have on the numbers of pregnant 
addicts opting for treatment? 
 
Whilst the existing criminal law might be utilised to incarcerate 
pregnant users, the likelihood of new laws being introduced to 
render their actions criminal is remote. Even in the USA where 
numerous bills have proposed the criminalisation of drug or alcohol 
use in pregnancy,102 only one has actually been enacted103 due to 
the potential conflicts such legislation would have with the human 
rights of pregnant women and the overwhelming evidence from 
medical organisations that foetal health would not be protected by 
criminalisation measures. 104 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Judge LJ stated in St George's, that '[i]n our judgment while 
pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of a woman it does 
not diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo 
medical treatment'.105 
 
If we accept that there is an element of choice in drug and 
alcohol dependency, then that choice, however morally reprehensible, 
must be upheld. To do otherwise is to dictate to the pregnant woman 
standards of rationality and normality; to curb her ability to selfgovern; 
and to recognise the foetus as a rights holder. If, however, 
we accept that there are cases where drug- or alcohol-dependent 
individuals are not free to choose treatment because of their clinical 
or psychological drug dependency, then the law might protect the 
foetus without recognising it as a rights-holder. It may do so by 
aligning the interests of mother and future child and compelling 
treatment in the woman's best interests by finding that, in relation 
to the particular decision, she lacks capacity. Alternatively, in cases 
of dual diagnosis, treatment might be compelled where the pregnant 
woman suffers a mental disorder under the Mental Health Act 1983. 
Finally, where the addict has committed a crime, a prison sentence 
may be used as a threat, in order to achieve compliance with a drug 
testing or treatment order. 
 
Ultimately the moral duty of the pregnant woman to accept 
treatment beneficial to the foetus is strengthened if that duty is 
made less onerous. Funding for specialist treatment placements, 
communication, education and the reduction of stigma will increase 
the number of women successfully treated in pregnancy. Coercion and 
compulsion will generate fear and distrust. Yet I have advanced four 
reasons why the current political climate gives cause for concern. 
First, as Scott eloquently demonstrates, 106 though both the European 
Court of Human Rights and the English courts are reluctant to give 
the foetus legal rights, this does not imply that the foetus is not valued 
at all. In Vo v France it was recognised that: 'The potentiality of 
that being and its capacity to become a person . . . require protection 
in the name of human dignity, without making it a 'person' with 
the 'right to life' for the purposes of Article 2'. 107 In England, Lord 
Justice Judge in St George's Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v S stated that 
' [ w ]hatever else it may be, a 36-week foetus is not nothing; if viable 
it is not lifeless and it is certainly human' .108 
 
There is much to recommend this approach. Whilst opinion 
is divided as to the best way to adjudicate potential conflicts of 
interest between the foetus, the pregnant woman and the state, most 
would agree that the foetus should not be discounted altogether. 
The paramount importance of the pregnant woman's rights does not 
render the foetus meaningless. Difficulties only arise if the judges' 
wise words are applied so as to give effect to the moral duty to 
protect the foetus in a manner that harms the interests of pregnant 
women. 'Interests' are not as assiduously protected as rights. They 
are also harder to define. Care must to be taken to ensure that where 
the pregnant woman loses her right to give and withhold consent, by 
virtue of committing a crime, lacking mental capacity or suffering a 
mental disorder, her interests are still paramount. 
 
Second, there is the recent criminal justice initiative to employ 
treatment as a sentencing alternative. Where a drug or alcohol misuser 
commits an offence, the English criminal justice system has at last 
reacted to evidence that punishment without treatment lacks efficacy. 
Following the model of the US 'drug courts', which have existed since 
1989, testing, treatment, sanctions and incentives replace punishment. 
We have only followed the USA part of the way. At present in the 
UK the consent of the offender is required before a treatment order 
can be made. The US drug courts have considerably reduced the 
level of reoffence109 and are clearly effective,ll0 and this has led 
many states to extend the principle to non-offenders. Involuntary 
commitment programmes, some of which are state-funded, often 
prioritise pregnant women. 
 
Third there is the government's reluctance to incorporate an 
exclusion clause in the doomed draft Mental Health Bill to prevent the 
labelling of drug- or alcohol- dependent individuals as suffering from 
a mental disorder. In view of this, the likelihood of our eventually 
following the worrying precedent created by the extension of the 
American 'drug courts' to involuntary civil commitment seems more 
plausible. 
 
Finally the Draft Code of Practice on the Mental Capacity Act 
accepts that the symptoms of alcohol or drug misuse might constitute 
'impairment' for the purposes of the Act. Where this is the case, 
provided the treatment is in her 'best interests' then the individual 
may be treated without consent. If it can be demonstrated that but for 
the addiction, the pregnant woman would have consented to treatment 
of benefit to the foetus, and that a failure to treat at the relevant time 
could be detrimental to the pregnant woman, then treatment may be 
declared lawful. And this is as it should be, provided that the decision 
is motivated by the best interests of the pregnant woman rather than 
those of the 'unique organism' which is 'certainly human'. 
The NHS National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse111 is 
working to make the route into treatment less onerous. Let us support 
that and resist the American way. 
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